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Abstract
Freedom of thought is not directly protected as a right in the United States. Instead, US
First Amendment law protects a range of rights that may allow thoughts to be expressed.
Freedom of speech has been granted especially robust protection. US courts have extended this
protection to a wide range of commercial activities judged to have expressive content. In
protecting these rights, US jurisprudence frequently relies on the image of the marketplace of
ideas as furthering the search for truth. This commercial image, however, has increasingly
detached expressive rights from the understanding of freedom of thought as a critical forum for
individual autonomy. Indeed, the commercialization of US free speech doctrine has drawn
criticism for “weaponizing” free speech to attack disfavoured economic and regulatory policies
and thus potentially affecting freedom of thought adversely. The Internet complicates this
picture. This paper argues that the Supreme Court’s expansion of the First Amendment for the
benefit of commercial actors lies in the problematic tension with the justification for individual
freedom of thought resting in personal self-direction and identity.

Keywords
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1. Introduction
US constitutional law provides no direct protection for freedom of thought. Instead, it
protects a range of associated rights such as freedom of expression or freedom of religion that
might be thought to bolster freedom of thought more or less directly. US jurisprudence,
however, has interpreted these associated rights through the lens of the marketplace of ideas.
This commercialization, once metaphorical and today increasingly literal, creates deep tensions
in the US between freedom of thought as critical to personal self-direction and identity and rights
such as freedom of speech with which it has been associated. Analyzing how, in the US, a
confluence of legal streams linking speech and commerce has drawn free speech away from
freedom of thought is the goal of this article.
The US First Amendment does not address what might be characterized as the inner
sanctum of free thought: the ability of individuals to exercise robust autonomy in the ideas they
formulate, entertain, and believe. Instead, the First Amendment to the US constitution protects
residents against governmental interference with a list of freedoms: the free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble peaceably, and the right to
petition government for redress of grievances. Each of these rights bears a clear relationship to
freedom of thought. For example, protecting free exercise of religion allows people to worship in
accord with their religious beliefs. Together, these rights would appear to provide extensive
protection for the manifestation of thoughts in the world. Neither separately nor together,
however, do they directly protect thoughts themselves. For example, allowing people to worship
in accord with their religious beliefs is not the same as protecting people from practices that
inhibit their ability to reconsider their religious beliefs.
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Moreover, US First Amendment doctrine for at least a century has moved toward
understanding speech in marketplace terms. US Supreme Court doctrinal support for free speech
is rooted in the idea that market competition will winnow out better ideas from inferior
ones. First Amendment doctrine also protects both natural and corporate persons as speakers in
this market, placing both persons and commercial entities on the same level. What is more,
commercial actors are receiving increased protection under an additional First Amendment
freedom, the free exercise of religion. These developments, we contend, are at best orthogonal to
and more likely in tension with justifications for individual freedom of thought resting in
personal self-direction and identity. So are developments in a related area of free speech
doctrine: compelled speech, where court decisions protect commercial actors from requirements
to reveal information that might be economically deleterious.
Against this backdrop, the Internet brings further challenges to freedom of thought in the
US. Ever-present in the world in which US First Amendment doctrines are continuing to
develop, the Internet remains largely undertheorized in US jurisprudence. The immediacy and
scale of social media, big data analytics, and powerful methods for tracking individuals
challenge both the functioning of the marketplace of ideas and individuals’ ability to maintain
any semblance of privacy and secrecy of thought. Yet US law and First Amendment doctrine
leave the Internet largely on its own, viewing platform providers not as themselves speakers but
merely as the now-virtual location in which speech takes place. A further problem is that, as
private actors, platform providers are not subject to the First Amendment restrictions on state
actors. Thus constructed, US free speech doctrine may ironically provide cover for losses of
individual privacy and full understanding of how information is presented that take place in the
forum of the Internet—both essential to freedom of thought in the deeper sense of mental
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autonomy or personal sovereignty.1 Finally, the Court has not developed privacy jurisprudence
in a way that could counter these trends.2

2. First Amendment Rights and Freedom of Thought
In this short contribution, we cannot hope to give a full account of the many difficult
questions in political and legal theory raised by freedom of thought. Here, we outline only a few
claims about the right to freedom of thought that are essential to our discussion. Most
fundamentally, we think that US jurisprudence in its focus on freedom of expression
characterized in commercial terms has moved away from a jurisprudence supportive of freedom
of thought. We begin with a brief characterization of freedom of thought.
Freedom of thought differs from freedoms to manifest thoughts. Yet characterizing
freedom of thought as a right apart from its manifestations is difficult. Spatial metaphors such as
the “inner sanctum” of the mind are common but obscure. Here, the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights Article 18 provides suggestive guidance: “Everyone has the right to freedom of

E.g., S. McCarthy-Jones, “The Autonomous Mind: The Right to Freedom of Thought in the
Twenty-First Century”, Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence 2(9) (2019). Retrieved 12 April 2021
https://doi.org/10.3389/frai.2019.00019.
2 Although the Court’s decisions about intimate personal matters such as reproduction initially
were framed in terms of privacy, these decisions are now framed in terms of liberty. E.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The only U.S.
Supreme Court decision dealing with informational privacy is Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977), which upheld the authority of the state to collect patient records of controlled substance
prescriptions as long as the confidentiality of the information was adequately protected. Today,
however, these data bases and their use are controversial. J. D. Oliva, “Prescription-Drug
Policing: The Right to Health-Information Privacy Pre- and Post-Carpenter”, Duke Law Journal
69 (2020) 775-853.
1
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thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”3 The European Convention on
Human Rights mirrors the Article 18 language in Article 9(1), with an accompanying provision,
Article 9(2), permitting restrictions on external manifestations of beliefs in accord with law as
necessary to protect others.4
These human rights documents understand freedom of thought to involve the ability to
formulate and change beliefs about matters of deepest importance to human life, not only the
ability to express whatever thoughts come to mind. Thus understood, freedom of thought is
closely related to, but far broader than, the freedom to formulate moral beliefs (conscience) or to
adopt spiritual beliefs (religion). Swaine describes freedom of thought in this sense as
encompassing a wide range of mental phenomena, including “deliberation, imagination, belief,
reflection, reasoning, cogitation, remembering, wishing, sensing, questioning, and desiring.”5
Bublitz similarly characterizes freedom of thought as protecting “all kinds of mental states.”6
McCarthy-Jones delineates three contours of the right: the right not to reveal one’s thoughts, not
to be penalized for one’s thoughts, and not to have one’s thoughts manipulated. 7

3

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948),
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
4 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1950),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; J.C. Bublitz, “Freedom of Thought
in the Age of Neuroscience”, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 100(1) (2014) 1–25.
5 L. Swaine, “Freedom of Thought as a Basic Liberty”, Political Theory 46(3) (2018) 405-425, p.
411.
6 Bublitz, supra note 4, at 3.
7 McCarthy-Jones, supra note 1, drawing on S. Alegre, “Rethinking Freedom of Thought for the
21st Century”, European Human Rights Law Review 3 (2017) 221- 233, in turn drawing on B.
Vermeulen, “Article 9”, in P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn and L. Zwaak (eds.) Theory and
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Cambridge: Intersentia Press
2006), p. 751. See also P. O’Callaghan and B. Shiner, “The Right to Freedom of Thought in the
5
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The close connection of freedom of thought to freedom of speech is that freely-created
ideas may be voiced and tested publicly. Expressing their thoughts enables people to assess their
thoughts’ value for others and how these thoughts may be changed, abandoned or accepted. The
metaphor developed in US law for this process is the marketplace of ideas. In this competition,
better ideas, like better products, win out over time. As we argue below, however, this metaphor
has lent a commercialized turn to US speech jurisprudence in a number of ways that may prove
to be in tension with freedom of thought. 8
Freedom of thought understood as freedom of mental life requires some protections in the
world. How it does so may be complex. Some thoughts—daydreams or fleeting emotions—may
occur without external manifestations, although even these require protections from intrusions
such as torture that blot out all possibilities of mental life. Other thoughts—perhaps criticisms of
others or unpopular political positions—may require protection from compelled expression. Still
other views—deeply held moral or religious convictions, for example—arguably require direct
expression in the world.9
Conversely, freedom of thought is arguably important for other freedoms. For example,
freedom of expression may depend on freedom of thought at least to some extent. A society in
which people are able to say whatever they want but have nothing to say might not be a society

European Convention of Human Rights”, European Journal of Comparative Law and
Governance (2021) 1-34.
8 In this respect, our argument parallels that of Vincent Blasi, who contended that the turn
towards the marketplace of ideas in U.S. free speech jurisprudence “has had the undesirable
effect of focusing attention too much on the truth seeking and self-government values [of speech]
and on the function of free speech as a social mechanism.” Blasi argues that this turn has made
the defence of speech too dependent on problematic empirical assumptions about how speech
countered by more speech encourages enlightening dialogue. V. Blasi, “Holmes and the
Marketplace of Ideas”, Supreme Court Review (2004) 1-46.
9 Swaine, supra note 5, at 416.
6
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in which freedom of expression is manifest. Conceptualizing freedom of expression as linked to
freedom of thought in this way requires understanding freedom of expression as not merely a
right against interference in the immediate moment of voicing opinions. This conceptualization
invites controversies about so-called “positive” and “negative” rights.10 In this contribution, we
assume that all rights have at least some “claims against” and “claims for” features.11 For
example, the right to freedom of expression as a right against interference requires sufficient
public order to assure non-interference. The issue is not whether a right is “positive” or
“negative” per se, but the constellation of restraints and assurances involved in its recognition.
More deeply, some argue that freedom of thought is the foundational value for freedom
of expression. Justice Cardozo wrote over 75 years ago that freedom of thought and expression
was so critical as to justify application of this right to states through the constitutional protection
of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment12:

This is true, for illustration, of freedom of thought and speech. Of that freedom
one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive recognition of that truth
can be traced in our history, political and legal. So it has come about that the
domain of liberty, withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment

10

See e.g., I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979).
See e.g., H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); G. MacCallum, Jr., “Negative and Positive Freedom”,
The Philosophical Review 76(3) (1967) 312-334.
12 In the U.S., the Bill of Rights initially applied to the federal government. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War, prohibits states from
depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. This provision has been construed to apply most of the guarantees of the Bill
of Right to the states.
11
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by the states, has been enlarged by latter-day judgments to include liberty of the
mind as well as liberty of action. 13

Notably, however, Justice Cardozo conceives of thought and expression as a single
freedom here, so it is unclear whether he would regard freedom of thought as the more basic
value. Seana Shiffrin, professor of law and philosophy at UCLA, has argued that the best
justification for freedom of expression is freedom of thought, although she is clear that her view
is a normative one that is not necessarily reflected in US case law.14 Neil Richards, a law
professor at Washington University in St. Louis and an expert in privacy law, has argued that
what he calls “intellectual privacy” is necessary for the justification of freedom of speech. 15
Without protection from intrusion on processes of developing thoughts, Richards contends, we
may have nothing to say.16 For Richards, there are three core elements of intellectual privacy:
freedom of thought, the right to read, and the right to communicate with others in confidence.
Richards’ case for intellectual privacy is primarily a moral one; he writes: “The commitment to
intellectual freedom outlined here is a moral one—that we should protect intellectual freedom

13

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
S. V. Shiffrin, “A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech”, Constitutional
Commentary 27 (2011) 283-307. Shiffrin defends political speech, religious speech, artistic
speech, personal speech, and dissent as foundational. Her view is that the case for commercial
speech is only instrumental: “On the other hand, protection for commercial and non-press,
business corporate speech is a less central matter, one that reasonably may involve weaker
protections and may reasonably rely heavily on more instrumental concerns.” Ibid. p. 285. She
thus rejects the centrality given commercial speech by the Court that we describe later in this
article. Moreover, she voices the concern that corporate speech may be shaped by pressures that
run counter to individual freedom of thought: “…non-press, business corporate and commercial
speech, by design, issue from an environment whose structure does not facilitate and, indeed,
tends to discourage the authentic expression of individuals' judgment.” Ibid. p. 296.
15 N. Richards. Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital Age (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2015).
16 Ibid. p. 122.
14
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and intellectual privacy because they are necessary elements of a good and free society.” 17 The
question we will address more fully below is whether the current directions of US Supreme
Court jurisprudence run against these justifications for free speech in terms of freedom of
thought.
Moreover, on many views the protections required for freedom of are not merely
protections from interference. To engage fully in freedom of thought requires contexts for
reflection, exposure to information and ideas, and protection from pressures about how to think.
The Internet poses particular challenges to reflection of this fuller kind. Aggregating data from
many sources—such as people’s Internet searches or social media posts—may reveal what
people might be thinking, even when they do not fully recognize it themselves. The knowledge
that such aggregation could occur may chill exploration of new ideas from the wide range of
sources now available over the Internet. Hidden methods for altering or faking apparent facts or
sources destabilize reliance on information. Other technological developments, such as
neuroimaging or remote sensing, portend far fuller abilities to uncover the privacy of the mind.18
Despite these developments, US jurisprudence addresses First Amendment liberties
rather than freedom of thought. First Amendment jurisprudence primarily rules on actions by
federal or state governments judged to interfere with expressions. US law has not addressed
thought formation explicitly. Nor has it considered the role of private power in shaping how or
what people can think. Instead, the focus of US jurisprudence is on marketplace competition
among ideas.

17
18

Ibid. p. 105.
Bublitz, supra note 4, at 7.
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3. US Free Speech Doctrine and the Marketplace of Ideas
Although protections for free speech and the free exercise of religion were enshrined in
the US constitution and date from the beginning of the republic, US First Amendment
jurisprudence is primarily a creation of the twentieth century and its aftermath. 19 Protection for
dissidents against criminal prosecution—war protesters, religious groups such as Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and civil rights advocates—was a common sub-text. The metaphor of truth emerging
from the marketplace of ideas as the frame for First Amendment protection of such disfavoured
speech was invoked frequently in decisions and helped to shape the course of First Amendment
law.
A very brief account of the US framework for analysis of rights protection may be
helpful for what follows. The framework applies levels of scrutiny, from “strict” to merely
rational basis. The level of scrutiny applied depends on whether the right to be protected is
characterized as fundamental. Political speech protected under the First Amendment is an
example of a fundamental right. A right’s status as fundamental does not mean that the right can
never be abridged by the state. Rather, it means that to limit the right the state must have a
justification that is sufficiently strong to survive “strict scrutiny.” To pass strict scrutiny, the
government must have a compelling interest, such as protecting national security, protecting life,
or protecting health. In addition, laws or regulations in furtherance of this interest must be
“narrowly tailored,” neither sweeping too broadly nor carving out only part of what must be
included to further the compelling interest. Speech of the highest value, such as political speech,
may only be limited when the state can pass this exacting strict scrutiny test.

See e.g., E. Zoller, “Foreword: Freedom of Expression: ‘Precious Right’ in Europe, ‘Sacred
Right in the United States?”, Indiana Law Journal 84 (2009) 803-808; E. Zoller, “The United
States Supreme Court and the Freedom of Expression”, Indiana Law Journal 84 (2009) 885-916.
19
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In contrast, “rational basis” scrutiny requires only that the state have some reason
supporting the law or regulation at issue, even if the reason is not a particularly plausible one.
This level of scrutiny is applied to the vast array of economic regulations in place today.
“Intermediate” scrutiny may be applied to important rights that do not rise to the level of being
fundamental. This scrutiny requires the state to show an important interest and a law that is
carefully defined to further that interest. Regulation of speech that is considered of lesser value
than political speech, such as commercial speech, has historically been given intermediate
scrutiny, although there are indications that the Court is increasingly moving towards tightening
the level of scrutiny applied to commercial speech regulation.20 Importantly, some utterances—
obscenity or certain insults—may not be considered protected speech at all by US courts and
thus are treated as outside the purview of the First Amendment.
A parallel analytic framework is applied in US equal protection jurisprudence. Strict
scrutiny is required for laws or regulations that employ “suspect classifications” such as race.
Rational basis analysis applies to many other categorizations, including perhaps surprisingly
disability.21 “Intermediate” scrutiny may be applied to categories that are not fully “suspect,”
such as sex. The framework has increasingly collapsed in recent Supreme Court decisions,

20

E.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ASSESSING COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT, R45700 (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45700.pdf.
21 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The Court majority applied
rational basis scrutiny to disability because it judged that the state needed to be able to engage in
regulation for the benefit of people with disabilities and that it had largely done so beneficently.
It did, however, find that the regulation in question in the case, a zoning regulation that
prohibited group homes in the area, could not meet the rational basis test. Justice Marshall
dissented vigorously in the case, pointing out the long history of isolation and mistreatment of
people with disabilities.
11
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however. We will discuss how this framework evolved with respect to commercial speech in
particular more fully in what follows.
3.1 The introduction of the marketplace of ideas amid fears of subversion.
The development of US free speech jurisprudence was closely intertwined with fears of
subversion that rose and fell in the US across the twentieth century. The analogy of the
marketplace of ideas first came into play in a series of cases during and after the first World War,
an era of heightened US reaction to perceived threats of European socialism.22 In these cases,
advocates of pacifism and labour rights were prosecuted for alleged espionage or domestic
terrorism under the federal Espionage Act of 1917. In Schenck v. U.S., regarded as the first
“important case involving free speech” decided by the Supreme Court 23 and the classic source
for the doctrine that speech may be restricted when it poses a “clear and present danger,” Justice
Holmes wrote for the Court that “the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done ... [t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.” 24
Justice Holmes’s support for upholding the prosecutions, however, did not extend to
speech restrictions that arguably went far beyond the immediate danger he had judged apparent
in Schenck. It was in defence of dissenting speech that he deployed the image of the struggle for
truth in the competition of ideas in the market. As the Court majority continued to uphold

22

E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
This is the description of Schenck given by the Court itself in Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
24
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Decisions utilizing this analytical frame
include Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239
(1920).
23
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restrictions by balancing the benefits of speech against its perceived risks, Justice Holmes
famously wrote:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. 25
Holmes’s defence of speech as free trade was rooted in his pragmatist vision of the First
Amendment26 and apparently also his reading of John Stuart Mill.27 However, it is highly
questionable whether Mill himself thought of the economic marketplace as the justification for
freedom of expression.28 Nowhere in On Liberty does Mill himself use the marketplace imagery,
although he is often associated with it.29 Nor is it clear that pragmatist views about truth as
related to scientific experimentalism should be thought of in market terms.30
As fears of war waned and decades passed, the Court adopted increasingly robust speech
protections expanding what was to count as speech and insisting on the immediacy of threats to

25

Abrams v. United States., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
C. P. Wells, “Old Fashioned Postmodernism and the Legal Theories of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.”, Brooklyn Law Review 63 (1997) 59-85.
27 Blasi, supra note 8, at 19.
28 J. Gordon, “Mill and the ‘Marketplace of Ideas’”, Social Theory and Practice 23(2) (1997)
234-249.
29 See e.g., J. B. Biddle, “Advocates or Unencumbered Selves? On the Role of Mill’s Political
Liberalism in Longino’s Contextual Empiricism”, Philosophy of Science 765 (2009) 612-623.
30 See e.g., J. Capps, “The Pragmatic Theory of Truth”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/truth-pragmatic/>.
26
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justify prohibitions of expression.31 Marketplace imagery was invoked frequently in these
evolving speech protections. For example, in upholding the rights of peaceful picketers in a
labour dispute, Justice Murphy wrote for the Court: “Abridgment of the liberty of such
discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion.”32 In sum, the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas served to
defend speech against periodic concerns about the supposed dangers of subversion that waxed
and waned in the US with fears of war and supposed communist infiltration.
3.2 Diverging Patterns: Speech Robustly Protected and Speech Completely
Unprotected.
As speech gained increasing protection against regulation except in the face of immediate
danger, US courts also faced cases in which, it seemed, speech had no claim to value. Doctrines
developed that excluded some utterances from protection as speech altogether, such as obscenity
or so-called fighting words. In the other direction, doctrines increasing developed that insulated
protected speech from any regulation of its content. In some of the decisions, the Court invoked
the marketplace of ideas to support this bifurcation of the unprotected from the protected.
Chaplinsky, decided in 1942, set the stage by holding that lewd, obscene, profane, libellous, and
insulting words are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the

31

E.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104–05 (1940). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 283 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (a fair trial “is not a ‘free trade in ideas,’ nor is the
best test of truth in a courtroom ‘the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.’”).
32
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social interest in order and morality.”33 This reasoning stopped short of determining the
unprotected categories to be “non-speech,” however, instead seeing their expressive content as
meagre and outweighed by other social values.
This divided analytic frame has proved jurisprudentially problematic. The Court has
struggled to delineate categories of speech with such limited expressive content that it warrants
no protection, while refusing to adopt tests that would balance the value of any other speech
against its potential social harm. 34
“Hate” speech has posed particular difficulties because it presents a mix of instigation
and offensive content. Seen as instigation, it falls outside the realm of protected speech. Seen as
conveying a message of hate, it is speech, and the Court has refused to allow it to be prohibited
because of the content it expresses. Cross-burning, the iconic symbol of the racist Ku Klux
Klan’s threats against blacks, has been seen both as non-protected intimidation and as protected
expressions of racist enmity. Statutes seeking to prohibit cross-burning only pass constitutional
muster if they can be framed in terms of intimidation or the intent to intimidate rather than as
efforts to restrict racism. For example, a St. Paul Minnesota ordinance prohibiting the display of
symbols that arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender” was judged an impermissible content-based regulation because it addressed
the content of the symbol used to arouse anger, rather than the angry threats themselves.35 In
reaching this conclusion for the Court, Justice Scalia relied directly on the marketplace of ideas:

33

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Some earlier decisions reached different
conclusions, however. For example, in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Court
upheld an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of lithographs portraying the lack of virtue of
members of a group and sustained a conviction of Beauharnais under the ordinance for
distributing leaflets to halt the further encroachment of blacks into white neighbourhoods.
35 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
34
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“content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace …’” 36
On the other hand, the Court has allowed a Virginia state ban on cross-burning with the
intent to intimidate, while rejecting the ban’s presumption that cross-burning intends to
intimidate. Here, too, the Court said that the goal of the First Amendment is to “allow ‘free trade
in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or
discomforting.”37 It is consistent with this goal to allow speech with slight social value that
intends to threaten the social interest in order and morality to be prohibited. Threats to
intimidate may be prohibited. But the state may not single out some threats because their
content—cross-burning—is assumed to have the content of expressing an intent to intimidate. In
the judgment of the Court, to prohibit cross-burning because its racist symbolism is assumed to
be intended to intimidate would risk suppressing important ideas, for example cross burning as a
statement of group solidarity among members of the Ku Klux Klan. This reasoning arguably
detaches content from context; the Court’s observation that cross-burning could intend messages
other than intimidation based on race hatred38 (perhaps the message “I wish you weren’t my next
door neighbour” or “I’m glad you share my support for white supremacy”) might seem
disingenuous at best in the US today.
Obscenity is another category often characterized as beyond First Amendment protection
altogether. Although the Court has struggled to delineate the boundaries of obscenity, material

36

505 U.S. at 387.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).
38
538 U.S. at 362–363. To be fair, the Court began its opinion by recognizing the deep
connections between cross burning and Ku Klux Klan intimidation, 538 U.S. at 352–358.
However, the Court refused to allow this historical background to support the direct link between
cross burning and race intimidation drawn by the Virginia legislature.
37
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judged to appeal primarily to prurient interests with little social value has not been protected as
speech.39 In addition, the Court has permitted statutes banning child pornography that reach
beyond the contours of obscenity.40 These statutes ban depictions of children engaged in sexual
performances to discourage the performances themselves when their producers cannot be
identified. In upholding these prohibitions, the Court has emphasized protecting children from
exploitation despite effects on otherwise constitutionally protected activity.
The Court has resolutely refused to extend these models to any additional kinds of
speech, however, in decisions explicitly favouring commercial interchange. For example, in
2010, the Court held that a federal statute criminalizing the commercial creation or sale of
depictions of animal cruelty violated the First Amendment. 41 The statute had been narrowly
drafted to try to track the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence. It only applied in states where the
underlying conduct violated state or federal law. It exempted depictions with “‘serious religious,
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.’” 42 The statutory goal
was to prevent the transfer or sale of “crush” videos in which small animals are stomped on by
women wearing high heels. These videos were proliferating anonymously over the Internet, thus
shielding their producers from prosecution. The statute sought to deter transmission as an
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indirect attack on production, a strategy that had been upheld for child pornography. The Court,
however, found that the statute regulated speech based on its content because it only prohibited
depictions of intentional harm to a living animal rather than other kinds of depictions of harm.
(The underlying harm to the animal could of course have been prohibited.) The government
argued that the speech in question had minimal social value and was clearly outweighed by the
moral harm it might cause, but the Court rejected any such balancing. Instead, the Court refused
to construe the statute narrowly and recited multiple types of potentially outlawed depictions,
from dog fighting to wild boar hunting to humane (but illegal) killing of a stolen cow. The Court
thus found the statute invalid on its face. Congress replied by enacting a very limited statute 43
banning transmission of obscene animal crush videos; the statute has been upheld as banning
obscenity but has very limited coverage.44
California’s law prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors without
parental consent45 met a similar fate. Drafters had sought to limit the law’s reach by
incorporating language from statutes prohibiting obscenity; it covered games “‘in which the
range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually
assaulting an image of a human being’ … depicted in a manner that ‘[a] reasonable person,
considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of
minors…’”46 Emphasizing the difficulty of distinguishing entertainment from speech and the
importance of protecting expression, the Court refused to add any new category of speech as “too
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harmful to be tolerated.”47 Obscene games could be prohibited, but not violent ones. According
to Justice Scalia, the medium of speech does not change the basic principles of First Amendment
protection. Video games, novels, and fairy tales raise the same issues and must be judged by the
same standards. Ideas—“whether [they] be violence, or gore, or racism—and not [their]
objective effects, may be the real reason for governmental proscription,” and so the restriction on
violent video games impermissibly limits speech. 48 This assertion—that the medium does not
change the message or its claim to First Amendment protection—is critical to the Court’s
hesitancy to address the content of speech on the Internet, as discussed further below.

4. Protecting the Press and Other Traditional Media.
One of the most noteworthy developments about expression involves the growing role of
the Internet in comparison to traditional broadcast and print media. In the US, broadcast and
print media historically have received significant protection against suits for damages through
the First Amendment but some of these protections may be waning—and they pale against the
situation of speech over the Internet.
In 1964, the Supreme Court greatly expanded protection against defamation suits from
the doctrine that the truth is a defence to the doctrine that plaintiffs must prove actual malice in
the form that the publisher knew that the publication was false or acted with reckless disregard
for its falsity. The critical decision emerged during resistance to school integration in the US
South, when The New York Times published a full-page advertisement criticizing actions of the
police in Montgomery, Alabama, against civil rights protesters. 49 The ad was purchased by
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people known to The Times and the paper did not check its accuracy. The public official
responsible for supervising the police sued the Times for defamation in a suit seen by many as a
racist effort to suppress publicity about the violence of Alabama officials against civil rights
protests. Because some details in the ad were false, The Times could not invoke truth as a
defence; an Alabama jury awarded Sullivan an unprecedented $500,000 in damages on a finding
that the publication was libellous per se—that is, false and presumed injurious to the person’s
reputation without further proof of harm.50 The Supreme Court held that the Alabama libel law
violated the First Amendment commitment to the “‘unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” 51 Erroneous statements,
the Court said, “must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’
that they ‘need…to survive.’”52 A subsequent decision extended Times v. Sullivan to any public
figures.53 The Court refused, however, to extend the holding to create an evidentiary privilege for
editorial deliberations, concluding that such a privilege would effectively preclude any libel suits
by public figures.54 This refusal to protect the editorial process behind the speech might be
thought of as a grant of protection to speech in the world but not a protection to underlying
processes of thought.
Controversies about truth and “fake news” have brought the continued viability of Times
v. Sullivan under fire. Former President Donald Trump vehemently condemned the precedent
for making it too difficult for public figures to win libel suits.55 In 2019, Justice Clarence
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Thomas reached out to attack the holding in a concurrence to a denial of certiorari. A woman
who had accused the entertainer Bill Cosby of harassment claimed that Cosby’s lawyer had
defamed her by making allegations about her reputation; her suit was dismissed because as a
public figure she came under the Times v. Sullivan requirement to show actual malice. Although
agreeing with the Court’s decision not to disturb the lower court’s ruling, Justice Thomas wrote
separately to “reconsider the precedents that require courts to ask it in the first place.”56 He
scathingly characterized Times v. Sullivan and similar decisions as “policy-driven decisions
masquerading as constitutional law.”57 Justice Thomas’s approach would draw a sharp
distinction between false attacks on public figures—which would receive no protection and
warrant at least nominal damages even absent any proof of reputational harm—and criticisms
that are true. The approach would subject traditional print and broadcast media to suits such as
the one in Times v. Sullivan. Adopting the approach would amplify the impact of the current US
legal treatment of social media platforms as not responsible for the content of the material they
transmit, about which more below.
Invasion of privacy is another domain in which the Court has invoked the First
Amendment. Traditional media have been protected against suits when they publish information
that has been lawfully obtained, such as reports that identify alleged crime victims. In a 1975
decision, a reporter learned the name of a 17-year old rape-murder victim and broadcast her
name; the victim’s identity was in the indictments which were public records available for

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/womanadvocate/practice/2019/reevaluating-new-york-times-v-sullivan-in-the-wake-of-modern-dayjournalism/.
56 McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
57 139 S. Ct. at 676.
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inspection at the court but not otherwise publicised.58 Her father sued for damages for invasion
of privacy. A Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanour to publish the name of a rape victim59
was the basis for the father’s claim that rape victim were not public figures. The Court analysed
the case as a conflict between privacy and constitutional protection for speech but did not rely on
the broader proclamation that truth is a defence in all suits against newspapers by private figures.
Instead, in striking the statute as violating the First Amendment, the Court invoked the
importance of fair reporting of trials and the beneficial effects of public scrutiny.
A later decision reached a similar conclusion about publication despite the victim’s
contention that her family had received threatening phone calls. Florida law prohibited
publication of rape victims’ identities in police reports, but the police department erroneously
released the victim’s name and the paper published it in violation of their internal policy against
naming rape victims. In rejecting her suit against the paper, the Court said that although the state
could protect victims’ confidentiality, any restriction on publishing lawfully released material
must be narrowly tailored to state interests of the highest order. Although the state might have a
strong interest in protecting victims, a damages award for later newspaper publication was not
narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. 60 These decisions predated the Internet; presumably the
materials in question would today be revealed in the US by Internet searches, putting the victims
at risk of vilification. 61 In the EU, the right to delisting, better known as the “right to be
forgotten,” might yield more privacy protection.
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5. Commercial Speech and Commercial Actors
Justifying freedom of expression in terms of the marketplace of ideas invites
conceptualization of speakers as commercial actors. Not surprisingly, interpretations of the First
Amendment have expanded to protect commercial speakers as nearly on a par with human
speakers. These interpretations are especially prevalent among the Supreme Court’s conservative
justices. Anti-paternalism is a key theme in this evolution, with the Court rejecting any effort to
protect the public against the economic motivations of speakers.
Supreme Court doctrine regarding speech by commercial actors did not begin in this way,
however. Only in 1975 did the Court clarify the eligibility of commercial speech for First
Amendment protection. And it was in 1978 that the Court placed corporations on a par with
natural persons as speakers.62 These decisions outlined differing levels of protection for
commercial speech and political speech, parallel to the levels of protection found in the equal
protection law of the time. Although advertising is speech, regulation of commercial advertising
was required to pass heightened scrutiny in the form of a requirement for there to be a substantial
governmental interest in the regulation and a regulatory measure carefully defined to further that
state interest. Regulation of non-commercial speech was held to the even higher standard of strict
scrutiny, a compelling state interest coupled with narrow tailoring to further that interest. These
levels have been collapsing for commercial speech, however, as we now explain.
The clear assertion of First Amendment protection for commercial speech began with
challenges to restrictions on advertising by professionals. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
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Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,63 decided in 1976, the Court was asked to rule on a state
law banning pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. Consumers had brought the
suit, seeking access to the price information that the pharmacists wished to advertise. The Court
explicitly disavowed any earlier cases that had suggested commercial speech might not be
eligible for First Amendment protection and relied on a decision the year before that invalidated
a state statute prohibiting advertisements by abortion providers.64 Society, the Court said, has “a
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information,”65 especially information about
prices. Other advertising bans soon fell, too, such as bans on unsolicited mailing of information
about contraceptives,66 bans on printed advertising by lawyers,67 or bans on advertising alcoholic
beverage prices.68 In the earlier decisions, the Court applied a lower standard of scrutiny to
commercial speech, especially for regulation to assure truthfulness and to protect consumers
against undue pressures of solicitation. By 1980, the Court had clarified that significantly lower
scrutiny only applied in these limited situations. In a decision invalidating a state ban on
advertising to encourage energy consumption,69 the Court emphasized that “[c]ommercial
expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and
furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information.” 70 Rejecting
paternalistic protection of consumers, the Court heightened the scrutiny test for regulation of
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commercial speech, requiring any regulation to be backed by a “substantial” state interest and
“designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.” 71
By the second decade of the twenty first century, any lesser protection of commercial
speech had largely atrophied. The decisions described in what follows have eliminated nearly all
regulation of campaign financing and have struck down other economic regulation for its
supposed effects on speech. Decisions in these cases increasingly reflect splits in the Court
between the more conservative and the more liberal justices.
The watershed decision concerned a federal prohibition of “electioneering
communication” by corporations or unions from their general treasury funds. Citizens United, a
non-profit that had produced a film highly critical of Hillary Clinton, sought to increase
distribution of its film before the 2008 election through on-demand video and advertising.
Concerned that the film and advertising would be considered electioneering, it brought suit
seeking a declaration that the provision of the campaign finance law prohibiting financing
electioneering from corporate or union funds was unconstitutional and preventing its application.
Prevailing Court precedent had upheld a Michigan law prohibiting direct contributions by
corporations to state political campaigns.72 In overruling this precedent in a 5-4 decision
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court applied strict scrutiny to any burdens on political speech,
even by corporations.73 It found that differentiation among speakers is directly connected to
control of their viewpoints and the content of their speech. 74 The public may not be deprived “of
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the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration.”75 The Citizens United Court rejected any consideration of whether the corporate
form gave some speakers a legally-created advantage over others. 76 In so doing, it also explicitly
rejected any suggestion that speech by media corporations or indeed corporations of any
particular type could be restricted. 77 And it emphasized the rationale that restrictions on
corporate speech interfere with open competition in the marketplace of ideas,78 dismissing as
mere “rhetoric…[that] ought not to obscure reality” the potential influence of “massive corporate
treasuries.”79 Freedom of thought emerged in the Court’s rationale as well: “When Government
seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his
or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control
thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”80
Finally, the Court also relied on technological innovation and the looming presence of the
Internet as reasons not to limit particular sources of speech. 81 A strongly-worded dissent by
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) emphasized the
importance of the distinction between corporate and human speakers in elections. 82
In the aftermath of Citizens United, corporate money has flooded US political campaigns,
to the delight of some and the consternation of many others.83 Measures designed to counter
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these effects have also been met with disapproval from the Court in 5-4 decisions pitting the
Court’s conservative majority against its more liberal justices. In 2011, the Court rejected
Arizona’s provision allowing candidates in state elections who accepted public financing to
receive funds matching expenditures by privately financed candidates over a set threshold. 84
Candidates and independent groups financing them claimed that the state’s efforts to equalize
expenditures unconstitutionally penalized their First Amendment rights. The state contended
that the matching funds increased speech, but the Court concluded instead that it burdened and
thereby reduced the speech of privately funded candidates. 85 On the other side, it rejected the
state’s asserted interest in levelling the playing field and opening electoral opportunities for
candidates with less wealth. Here, the Court said, “…in a democracy, campaigning for office is
not a game. It is a critically important form of speech. The First Amendment embodies our
choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is freedom—the
‘unfettered interchange of ideas’—not whatever the State may view as fair.” 86 The Court did not
reject all public financing for campaigns but insisted that any such financing must comport with
its view of what the First Amendment requires. Justice Kagan’s scathing dissent (joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor), pointed out that the Court’s reasoning undermined
any state efforts to protect democracy by ensuring that public financing programs provide
financing that is competitive with private funding of candidates. 87 These justices saw the state’s
program as providing a subsidy available to anyone who chose to use it, and the petitioners as
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demanding “essentially a right to quash others’ speech” through the prohibition of the subsidy
program, a right with which the “Court gladly obliges.”88
In 2014, the Court rejected an aggregate cap on campaign contributions by individual
donors. In this decision, the Court reiterated that the government could not attempt to level the
political playing field. And it stated explicitly that contributions may not be regulated to reduce
the amount of money in politics. 89 At this point in the US, the only permissible restrictions on
campaign contributions are those targeted directly to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. 90
Restrictions on how much money a donor may target to a political candidate or committee
remain permissible to combat corruption, but aggregate limits are not.
Commercial speech doctrine has continued to expand since Citizens United to forms of
speech that are clearly not political. In 2011, in Sorrell, the Court invalidated a state law
prohibiting the sale or use of information identifying the prescribing practices of individual
health care providers without their consent. 91 The law’s stated purpose was to reduce health care
costs. Although prohibiting use of the information for marketing, the law permitted it for health
care research, care management, or cost-effective utilization. The Court, again in an opinion by
Justice Kennedy, concluded that the law’s restrictions were based on the content of the speech
and the speaker and therefore violated the First Amendment. The restrictions were content based
because they disfavoured uses of the information for marketing, “that is, speech with a particular
content.”92 This analysis apparently disavows any distinction between what is said and how what
is said is used. The conclusion that the restrictions disfavoured particular speakers was more
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straightforward, however, as the statute forbade the use of the provider-specific information by
pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers.93 Justice Breyer’s dissent (joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan) would have applied a lesser standard to government regulation that may
affect commercial messages and expressed concern that the Court’s reasoning signalled a return
to judicial interference with government regulation of economic activity. 94
Restrictions on trademark registrations have also fallen. The Lanham Act95, the federal
statute establishing the federal registration system for trademarks, in effect for over 70 years,
prohibited registration of trademarks that disparaged members of racial or ethnic groups or that
were considered immoral or scandalous.96 The first of these prohibitions to come before the
Court involved disparaging names. The Asian rock group “The Slants” sought to trademark their
name as a way to reclaim the slur. In a decision featuring an even split on reasoning, the Court
ruled that the prohibition of disparaging trademarks was facially unconstitutional as viewpoint
discrimination.97 In applying strict scrutiny to the prohibition, Justice Alito’s opinion for four
justices reasoned that the First Amendment does not apply to the government as speaker and
concluded that trademarks are not government speech or government subsidies. Instead,
trademarks reflect the speech choices of those applying for them and may not be subjected to
restrictions based on their content unless these restrictions meet a test of heightened scrutiny. In
selecting the heightened scrutiny to be applied, the Court did not decide whether the trademark
was commercial speech; instead, it held that the prohibition of disparaging trademarks could not
meet the standard for commercial speech that regulation must be narrowly drawn to serve a
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substantial interest of the government. 98 State interests in preventing ideas that offend, Justice
Alito said, fly in the face of the First Amendment’s protection of “the freedom to express ‘the
thought that we hate.’”99 Interests in promoting the orderly flow of commerce also will not
suffice to justify regulation; while the government may prohibit discrimination, it may not insist
that commerce be cleansed of unhappy messages. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan concurring in part and dissenting in the judgment. These
justices agreed that the government could not regulate commercial speech based on its viewpoint
and invoked the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas to support this view.100 They stopped
short, however, of agreeing that the government is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny
altogether. In 2019, Justice Kagan wrote for the Court that the Lanham Act prohibition on
“immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks was also improper viewpoint discrimination. 101 This case
involved a trademark application for “FUCT,” a line of clothing. Justice Kagan’s opinion was
not joined by several justices who were concerned about its sweep and would instead have
upheld a narrow construction of the prohibition on scandalous trademarks. 102 These justices were
concerned to avoid any suggestion that the government is immune from First Amendment
scrutiny because of the potential implications for government-sponsored messages about
abortion, discussed below.

6. Compelled Speech
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Requiring speech is the converse of regulating it. In the US, requirements to speak are
also analysed as violations of the First Amendment. The Court’s compelled speech
jurisprudence, however, has been especially friendly to messages favoured by conservatives and
to protection of speakers with conservative viewpoints. In these cases, moreover, the Court has
greatly expanded the scope of what is considered to be speech itself.
Abortion jurisprudence is a particularly good example of the Court’s approach. A number
of US states have passed statutes requiring physicians to read messages to their patients designed
to discourage abortion. Pennsylvania required physicians to inform patients of the nature of the
procedure, the health risks of the abortion and childbirth, the “probable gestational age of the
unborn child,” and the availability of materials published by the state about alternatives to
abortion. The Court held that the state may require these disclosures as a matter of informed
consent “even when in so doing the State expressed a preference for childbirth over abortion.” 103
Many physicians object to reading state-prescribed statements to their patients, especially when
they consider these statements to be misleading and potentially damaging. States, however, are
permitted to require physicians to make statements that are scientifically questionable, such as
statements that abortion may increase risks of breast cancer or psychological trauma, or that a
foetus may feel pain early in development. 104
Yet the Court has struck down state requirements that patients be provided with accurate
information about the availability of abortions and the services provided by crisis pregnancy
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centres seeking to discourage abortions.105 California required licensed facilities providing
reproductive or pregnancy care to provide notice to pregnant patients of the availability of
abortion services funded by the state. The same statute required unlicensed facilities to inform
patients that they did not provide medical care or have a physician on staff. The state’s
justification for these requirements was informed consent: patients should be aware of care
alternatives and should be accurately informed about the services being offered. Pregnancy
centres sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute. Granting such an
injunction required the Court to determine that the moving party is likely to succeed on the
merits and the Court granted the injunction in a 5-4 decision. In the opinion for the Court, Justice
Thomas first concluded that the statute regulated speech based on its content, because it altered
what the plaintiffs would say, and would thus have to meet the high threshold of strict scrutiny.
Justice Thomas then determined that the Court had not recognized a special category of
professional speech as an exception to the high level of scrutiny applied to content-based
regulation. Regulation of professional speech, Justice Thomas said, contains the same risks of
suppressing unpopular views as regulation of speech in other contexts. Moreover, the
marketplace of ideas is just as important in the professional context as elsewhere. Justice
Thomas distinguished the California statute regarding licensed clinics from the Court’s earlier
decisions regarding the truth of professional advertising on the bases that the speech requirement
did not concern the clinic’s own services but services available from the state, and that the
required disclosure was not an uncontroversial statement about the facts.
The dissent challenged both of these reasons. Providing information about alternatives,
the dissent said, is a standard aspect of informed consent. The dissent also averred that the
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disclosure requirement was purely factual, about the services available from the state. With
regard to the unlicensed facilities, the Court also applied strict scrutiny, concluding that
California’s supposed reason for the requirement (to inform patients that they were not receiving
medical services) was not supported by evidence and that the requirement was an undue burden
on the facilities. In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy (joined by the other three justices in the
majority) wrote separately to emphasize that the problem with the California statute was not that
it was insufficiently narrowly tailored in the facilities to which it applied—a signal that even
amended versions of the statute would not be approved by the current Court. In the concurrence,
Justice Kennedy specifically linked the forced speech to freedom of thought: “Governments
must not be allowed for force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest convictions.
Freedom of speech secures freedom of thought and belief…”. 106
The federal government, too, has been permitted to attach messages to programs it funds.
Title X is a program that provides family planning grants to states. Lawmakers opposed to
abortion have sought to ensure that Title X funds are used for contraception only. A 1988
regulation prohibited facilities receiving Title X funds from providing abortion counselling or
referring patients for abortions—while requiring facilities to refer patients for prenatal
services.107 The Court upheld the regulation against a facial challenge based on the First
Amendment, among other grounds. In response to the contention that the restriction was
impermissible viewpoint discrimination, the Court said: “the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other.”108 Although upheld by the Court, this version of the regulation was suspended. However,
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action by the administration of former President Donald J. Trump to revive the 1988 regulation
and in addition require programs receiving Title X funds to separate entirely from providing
abortions was in ongoing litigation in early 2021.109
Religious speakers likewise receive protection, even when it is questionable whether
speech is involved at all and the right in question is the First Amendment right to the free
exercise of religion. To illustrate very briefly, a decision upholding a baker’s refusal to create a
cake celebrating a same sex wedding was based on the free exercise of religion rather than
freedom of speech, although the baker had contended that the cakes he made had expressive
content and a cake celebrating a same sex marriage would make statements with which he
disagreed.110 The cake shop owner has appeared on Fox news in support of other merchants
refusing to provide services to same sex couples in violation of state anti-discrimination laws.
He has directly linked his case and the case of others to the importance of their beliefs. 111
A final illustration of the Court’s willingness to entertain some messages but not others in
the area of compelled speech concerns the activities of public employee unions. Public
employees who opposed unions challenged required contributions to union activities that benefit
all employees. The union segregated all funds that were used for lobbying or political activities
and charged only the percentage of union dues that could be attributed to negotiations with
employers and other union responsibilities under the collective bargaining agreement. 112
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Overruling an earlier decision, the Court ruled 5-4 that the required contributions violated the
First Amendment. In paying the contributions, Justice Alito wrote, “individuals are coerced into
betraying their convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find
objectionable is always demeaning, and for this reason . . . a law commanding ‘involuntary
affirmation’ of objected -to beliefs would require ‘even more immediate and urgent grounds’
than a law demanding silence.”113 These claims hold even when all that is required is a subsidy
for the disfavoured beliefs, and even when the union is required by statute to act on behalf of all
employees. This is the decision that, Justice Kagan wrote, “weaponizes the First Amendment, in
a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory
policy.”114 The Court, said Justice Kagan, “has chosen the winners by turning the First
Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy…..And
it threatens not to be the last. Speech is everywhere—a part of every human activity
(employment, health care, securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all economic
and regulatory policy affects or touches speech. So the majority's road runs long. And at every
stop are black-robed rulers overriding citizens' choices. The First Amendment was meant for
better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic governance—including
over the role of public-sector unions.”115
To summarize briefly, the Court’s free speech jurisprudence has continued to clear away
regulations perceived as stifling market freedoms of commercial actors. The Court has reached
out to find expressive content in economic relationships and thereby disallowed regulations as
violating the First Amendment. Commentator Tim Wu describes the contemporary First
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Amendment as a “tool of Regulatory leverage used by politically powerful groups . . . in tension
with its goal of promoting democracy.”116 Connections to freedom of thought are at best opaque
in these decisions, especially when they give freer rein to powerful economic actors. At the same
time, the Court has sharpened the distinction between this robust First Amendment freedom
accorded private actors and governments themselves, to which the First Amendment apparently
does not apply in the same way. The federal government has required speakers to adhere to
moral messages conveyed by programs that it funds. States have been permitted to require
questionable messages of abortion providers—but forbidden to require abortion opponents to
speak truths that might violate their religious convictions. These doctrines threaten to detach
freedom of speech from freedom of thought, detachments that are even more apparent with
respect to speech over the Internet.

7. The Internet and Social Media
Transmission of material over the Internet takes place with unprecedented rapidity and
range. Screen time is seductive: there is always something new to click, follow, or watch.
Internet searching is of an utterly different order from the days in which physical visits to
newspaper archives, court records, or libraries were necessary to gather information. The
Internet also enables data aggregators to assemble remarkably complete pictures of individual
behaviour, not only through tracking online searches but also from apps and increasingly smart
devices from doorbells to refrigerators. Algorithms generate predictions about highly sensitive
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matters such as health or financial status, sometimes with questionable accuracy or
discriminatory impact.117 In addition, the Internet is filtered and structured by the economic
interests of advertisers and platforms in ways that are opaque to ordinary users. 118 No version of
the fairness doctrine that once applied to broadcast media but now does not has ever been
instituted for the private Internet. For all these reasons, it seems fair to say that the Internet
presents both enormous opportunities and enormous challenges to reflection and refined
thought—and perhaps to freedom of thought itself. In a nutshell, the Internet’s great success in
spreading materials may also be its greatest threat to reflective thought.
Calls for legal intervention in how the Internet currently functions in the US are mounting
but have as yet met with little success and their future in legislatures in the U.S. remains
unsettled as of this writing. Electoral intervention and rapid transmission of dangerous
falsehoods about health or security are primary targets. Websites such as Twitter have responded
voluntarily by taking down material that is judged to be dangerous during the COVID-19
pandemic. Other targets are concerns about uses of information about individuals without their
understanding or agreement, including the utilization of algorithms to serve up advertisements,
suggest pricing, or to otherwise disaggregate groups in ways that may magnify disadvantage or
implicitly discriminate. The Internet also creates boundless opportunities to insult, gaslight,
harass, dox, and deceive.
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On the other hand, defenders of Internet freedom caution about risks of suppression of
content or innovation. Some celebrate a raucous, boisterous, cacophonous “free market in
ideas.”119 The Internet also offers genuine opportunities to learn new techniques and
technologies. It allows explorations that transcend immediate limits of time and space. From
TED talks to self-published novels and individual blog postings, the Internet is a new forum for
telling personal stories. Quotidian information is readily available, too: how to fix your car, what
to make for dinner, or what tomorrow’s weather may bring. The net can bring famous
performances into anyone’s living room, often for free, even if they occurred more than half a
century ago.
In the US the marketplace of ideas has proven to be an especially powerful metaphor in
countering efforts to tame the Internet. The US legal regime governing the Internet was put into
place before the development of social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, which
function through user-posted content, reactions to content posted by others, and decisions to
share content with others. Through “Section 230,” enacted as part of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, US law stipulates that providers and users of interactive computer services
are not publishers or speakers of information provided by other content providers.120 The overall
aim of the Act was to protect children especially from indecent content, at a time when effective
filtering technologies had not yet been developed. Section 230 was a compromise between
defenders of the untrammelled Internet and those who wanted to protect users from what they
did not want to hear.121 Thus Section 230 also insulates providers and users from liability for
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“any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”122 In its
statutory findings in support of section 230, Congress explicitly cited the importance of
developing new technologies for user control and preserving “the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.”123
In 1997, in Reno v. ACLU, the Court struck down the portion of the Communications
Decency Act intended to protect minors by prohibiting the knowing transmission of obscene or
indecent messages to recipients under 18.124 There were exceptions for good faith efforts to
restrict access by minors or to require proof of age such as a verified credit card. The Court held
7-2 that these restrictions were impermissible content-based regulations of speech. It refused to
analogize these restrictions to time, place, and manner restrictions that had been upheld for
broadcast media, stating quaintly (this was 1997) that “the Internet is not as ‘invasive’ as radio or
television.”125 Instead, the Court found the government’s contention that the unregulated
availability of indecent material was driving many people away from the Internet “singularly
unpersuasive,” observing the “dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas.”126
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Section 230 has been interpreted as a complete shield from any liability for social media
platforms.127 The leading case involved an anonymous hoax: postings on AOL of tasteless shirts
for sale about the Oklahoma city bombing, using “Ken’s” name and the home telephone number
of Ken Zeran, who had nothing to do with the posts or shirts. New posts continued, despite
Zeran’s requests to have them taken down; their impact was magnified by a radio broadcaster
who urged people to call “Ken’s” number to complain. Ken Zeran, who allegedly had nothing to
do with the ad and had not produced the shirts, was besieged by phone calls and death threats; he
sued AOL for posting the ads. His suit was met with AOL’s successful assertion of section 230
as a defence, with the court quoting the Supreme Court’s language in Reno v. ACLU hailing the
Internet as a market of ideas. 128
Commentators today note that section 230 was enacted and interpreted129 in an era in
which the “weaponized virality” of the Internet was utterly unanticipated.130 Proposals to modify
or repeal section 230 are proliferating from all sides of the political spectrum. 131 Even Facebook
has appeared to recognize that some changes may be gathering support and argued in early 2020
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that procedures for accountability are preferable to content regulation. 132 One statutory change
has been enacted, the FOSTA-SENSA Act133 to hold online platforms responsible for advertising
sex trafficking. FOSTA-SENSA is embroiled in controversy, with Internet sites shutting down
personal advertising and sex workers concerned that they have been further endangered as a
result.134 FOSTA-SENSA has been challenged by free speech advocates and groups protecting
sex workers; as of early 2021, the litigation was ongoing,135 as was litigation in other cases
involving FOSTA-SENSA.136
The First Amendment is unlikely to help, as it is currently interpreted. The Court has
strongly suggested that the constitution does not require treating the Internet as a public forum
subject to First Amendment protections. In 2019, the Court refused to use the First Amendment
to declare statutorily established public access cable networks a public forum on which speech
must flourish.137 Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion for a 5-4 conservative majority drew a sharp line
between a “traditional, exclusive public function” 138 and a private function, a line that would
portend that operators of platforms on the Internet are not public forums. 139 This test is a
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conjunction: the function must be traditionally and exclusively performed by the government.
The First Amendment, stated Justice Kavanaugh, “prohibits only governmental abridgment of
speech. The Free Speech Clause does not prohibit private abridgement of speech.”140 Writing in
dissent, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that cable franchises are actors established by the state
and thus function as state agents. 141
Self-regulation by Internet platforms has addressed some abusive practices, particularly
those associated with bots and false representations of identity. The COVID-19 pandemic has
brought a number of further efforts to root out misinformation that may have dangerous health
consequences, such as the idea of drinking bleach as a way to counteract the infection.
Technological strategies have been proposed, such as moving away from centralized platforms
supported by advertising to decentralized protocols that would allow users to choose their own
filters for material they access.142 Suggestions have also been made that antitrust law should be
applied to break up corporations such as Facebook or Amazon and increase competition. Ananny
argues for increased transparency about probabilistic logics used by internet platforms to
determine whether content appears, circulates, or is removed. 143 Ananny is especially concerned
to examine the distribution of false positives and false negatives, thresholds of tolerable error,
and accountability of platforms for probability judgments that affect the content that is available
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and heard. But self-regulatory efforts are met with counter-incentives: protestors objecting to
private censorship and the continuing economic pressures of advertisers, data miners, and the
platforms that profit from them. 144
In the US, change beyond self-regulatory strategies will require amendment of section
230 to address the behaviour of social media platforms directly. Moreover, any content-based
changes in section 203 will surely encounter difficult First Amendment scrutiny from the current
conservative majority on the Court. Under Sorrell, so will any efforts to prohibit particular data
uses, or data uses by particular users.

8. Conclusion: Or What Next?
The First Amendment, we have argued, has been interpreted aggressively to protect
freedom of speech. Over the past century, the US Supreme Court has been the principal
institutional force defining this understanding. To justify a strong defence of unrestricted free
speech and increasingly to strike down regulations with effects on speech, the Court has relied on
the metaphor of the marketplace for ideas as the animating force. Along with this metaphor, the
Court has closely connected free speech to commercial speech. This link has given considerable
latitude to traditional businesses as speakers and to the rise of global social media firms.
Such aggressive use of the First Amendment, we suggest, may be in tension with at least
some of the conditions required for freedom of thought. It distracts from reflection. It potentially
subjects people to intense shaming and bullying for what they say. It allows subtle and
unrecognized commercial incentives to shape awareness and vision. It lets people, corporations,
and the government track, surveil, and react. Current First Amendment doctrine, in short, is far
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from friendly to freedom of thought. Ironically, in the US speech may be garnering such
increased protection that it makes freedom of thought more difficult.
So, what next? We see three possible approaches to the current state of affairs in the US
The first is greater reliance on individuals as choosers and the conditions needed for effective
choice. This is the notice and consent approach to data access and use. Much has already been
written about the advantages and disadvantages of this approach. 145 It would seem to be the least
intrusive and most respectful of individual differences. But it is only as effective as the
conditions created for choice: whether options are meaningful, people have the information they
need, and there is time for adequate reflection.
The second is increasing self-regulation by commercial actors. This may be the direction
of the future, but it is by no means guaranteed to be free thought friendly. From the standpoint of
free thought values, the preferable solution would be for large international infrastructure owners
and social media platforms to change their self-conception. Ideally, they would come to
understand themselves as a new kind of media company, with obligations to protect the global
public good of information and ideas. Defenders of democratic values should work hard to
emphasize the social responsibilities of digital infrastructure companies and help them both to
understand and to accept their constitutive role in the emerging global public sphere. This would
not be the first such transformation. In the twentieth century, the norms of American journalism
changed. In the 1890s newspapers were still rabidly partisan. In the early twentieth century,
influenced by Progressive era reforms, newspaper publishers and reporters gradually recognized
that they (and their competitors) had social responsibilities to the public as a whole rather than to

E.g., D. Susser, “Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy Disclosures Are Valuable
Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t”, Journal of Information Policy 9 (2019) 37-62.
145

44
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3837517

political parties. Over time they developed the professional norms of objectivity that we now
think of as the goals of properly trained professional journalists.
The third is increased regulation. Process-based regulations that increase accountability
for users and publishers are the most likely to be held constitutionally permissible in the US
Crafting these regulations may be difficult, as current US free speech jurisprudence would not
allow particular content, speakers, or uses to be targeted. Under Sorrell, for example, it will be
difficult to target commercial uses of data that consumers might find objectionable. Regulations
may become so narrow that they are of very limited impact, as with the current prohibition on the
transmission of animal crush videos that only applies to videos of this type that are also obscene.
Or, ironically, regulations that may be permissible because they are content-neutral may be
struck down because of their broader effects on speech by commercial actors, as with Citizens
United. If political pressures for change mount, however, pressures on the Court to retreat from
the weaponization of the First Amendment may mount as well. So may political pressures to
increase antitrust enforcement against what may be see as monopolistic practices by giant
technology companies.
Perhaps the best we can do at this point is to emphasize the importance of thinking about
freedom of thought and how it can be both constrained and enabled in the current environment.
While the Internet is novel, censorship is not. Just as there are more pressures today, there are
also more means to counter pressures. The marketplace of ideas is not the right metaphor for this
process, as the US exemplifies. A better metaphor than the marketplace of ideas for freedom of
thought, we suggest, is John Stuart Mill’s metaphor of an English garden flourishing with
different plants at different seasons, affected by and affecting the natural and social
circumstances in which it exists.
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